P rocess security is a newly pronounced issue facing the chemical process industry in the post 11 September era. Traditional safety is no longer sufficient for a chemical plant; it must also be secure. However, systematic and effective quantitative methodologies for process security analysis are necessary. To address this issue, the g-analysis method was introduced very recently by Uygun et al. (2003) as a process security analysis framework. By that method, a process security problem need be formulated as a minimum-time (to reach disaster) control problem. The method combines Pontryagin's minimum principle (with some modifications) with a discretization scheme to transform the security problem from a single dynamic-optimization problem to multiple static optimization problems, hence solving the process security problem without extensive system simulations.
INTRODUCTION
Security has been a major area of interest since the tragedy of 9/11, and an interest in chemical plant security has consequently arisen. The first response to this need is fashioned by conventional security techniques and applications of inherently safer design approaches to the chemical process security Q1 (CCPS, 2002; Cunningham, 2003; Margiloff, 2001; Ragan et al., 2002; Hendershot, 2003; US GAO, 2003) . In parallel, an interest in fundamental research for design of more secure processes has also surfaced . It should be noted that the process security problem is fundamentally different from a process safety problem as process security is concerned about the potentially catastrophic consequences of security threats that are not probable, but possible. As such, process safety techniques that rely on lowering probabilities of the occurrence of accidents are not sufficient in handling process security problems.
To facilitate quantitative assessment of process security, Lou et al. (2003) and Uygun et al. (2003 Uygun et al. ( , 2004a have developed a number of tools for analysis of the vulnerability level. While the analysis methods have significant differences, both works focus on the results of a security attack created by a technologically competent adversary that can gain limited control of the process. Note that no fundamental method can hope to prevent the consequences of a bomb being dropped on the facility. However, the inherent vulnerability of a process in cases of sabotages and accidents can be reduced by developing better designed processes. Note that while process security parallels inherent safety purpose-wise, from a methodology point of view it is a quantitative, deterministic and model-based approach. Process security analysis techniques complement the process safety techniques, hence carrying the promise for creation of truly safe and secure designs.
Early works on Process Security have led to the generation of a Fast Process Security Assessment Theory for chemical processes (Uygun et al., 2003 (Uygun et al., , 2004a . By that theory, a process security problem is formulated as a minimum-time dynamic optimization problem, and Pontryagin's minimum principle, along with several other assumptions, are employed to simplify the problem and transform it into a number of much simpler static optimization problems. This allows evaluating reasonably tight upper and lower bounds for the minimum time that the process will go to disaster under a security threat (Minimum Time to Disaster-MTD) without solving a rigorous dynamic optimization; hence it is a justifiable engineering solution to the rather difficult problem of predicting how a saboteur's mind works. However, the exact value of MTD is not evaluated. Also, the mathematical validity of the upper-bound relies on performing a very large number of optimization steps, which may hamper the rapidness and practicality of the evaluations in online usage. Same problems may also arise in sensitivity analysis studies under the g-analysis framework, such as construction of priority list and nonlinear contribution matrices (Uygun et al., 2004a) .
In this work, we will introduce a first-order approximation method to replace the zero-order approximations utilized in g-analysis, which occurs during the discretization step for application of Pontryagin's minimum principle. The improved g-analysis method with firstorder approximation reduces the number of function evaluations significantly, hence greatly improving the practicality of applications.
PROCESS SECURITY BASICS
This section summarizes the existing g-analysis method by Uygun et al. (2003) to provide an appropriate background for improved analysis method. However, the presentation will be given from the viewpoint of optimal control theory with new interpretations of the g-analysis method as a simplified minimum-time control problem. Definition 1. A typical process model consists of a number of state variables. Only a few of these (typically temperature and pressure) are directly used to define disaster conditions. These variables are referred to as critical variables (y c ), and the remainder of the state variables are denoted (y n ) such that y T ; [y c y n T ]. It should be noted that in this work the critical variable is considered as a scalar since g-analysis allows consideration of only one critical variable at a time at this point.
Definition 2 (Uygun et al., 2003) . A process is secure if:
where t (the MTD) is the minimum time required by the process to move from the nominal operation point to the disaster border; t r (the resolution time) is the minimum time needed for detecting the threat, making decisions, and taking necessary countermeasures to eliminate the threat.
While the exact value of resolution time depends on the process and is somewhat difficult to determine, it is suggested as a rule of thumb that any value above 15 minutes is acceptable and above an hour can be considered to be secure. Accordingly, the mathematical formulation for process security is as follows:
where y is the vector of system variables; d, the vector of disturbances. The reference points for defining the minimum time to disaster (t) are the nominal operation point, y c,0 , and the disaster border, y c,d , for the critical variable. The process security model in equation (3) needs to be capable of describing system behaviour beyond normal operation. Note that the state variables sensitive to security threats should be treated as disturbances when constructing a process security model. Also note that in a securitythreatening situation, some manipulated variables in the normal control context may be the causes of security threat; hence they need be considered as disturbances. While further discussion will be omitted here for the sake of brevity, these are critical points if the results of g-analysis are to be meaningful. For application of this method, careful review of the basic process security modelling principles Uygun et al., 2003 Uygun et al., , 2004a is recommended.
g-Analysis
The process security problem above is a minimum-time optimal-control problem with a nonlinear system model. The solution of the minimum-time problems is given by Pontryagin's minimum principle, which requires that the Hamiltonian of the problem is always minimized. This simplifies the problem, as the control objective is transformed to an instantaneous form (i.e., the integrand rather than the integral is minimized). This yields, for a linear system, a bang-bang control scheme (Bryson and Ho, 1969) . However, an additional question does arise regarding optimal switch time (i.e., the switch between the maximum and minimum value of a manipulated variable). An optimal switch profile is determined through the co-state equations, which may be difficult to evaluate as it is a two-point boundary-value problem. The optimal switch time, therefore, is generally determined by other methods, such as an additional step of numeric optimization or extensive analysis of the specific example, which is not preferable for nonlinear security models or the generalization ability of a suggested methodology. The alternative suggested in g-analysis is to rearrange the security problem for a single-state system to a more compact form:
where here is for a single-state system, hence the subscript is not essential. However, a method for distinguishing the critical variable from the other state variables is necessary for multi-state problems (which will be discussed in the following sections); hence the subscript is introduced for consistency in notation. Such a rearrangement is possible as the security problem is only concerned about the critical variable, and both the initial and the boundary conditions are specified for the critical variable. The rearrangement was first developed for systems with a single state variable (i.e., only the critical variable), so the additional differential equations in equation (3) did not play into the problem. The alternative form in equations (7) and (8) forms a dual problem to the original minimum-time problem in equations (2) through (6). For a single-state system, the Euler -Lagrange equation yields a solution very similar to Pontryagin's minimum principle, except that it is simpler as co-state equations are neither existent nor necessary. The optimal solution is then given by the disturbance profile d Ã which satisfies:
Note that the integration and hence the problem is now performed with respect to the critical variable rather than time. This solution in equation (9) requires that the derivative is maximized at all times (note that this solution is valid only for a single-state system). Based on this solution, the process critical time was defined below.
Definition 3 (Uygun et al., 2003) . The process critical time, v, as a worst-case estimate of t, is defined as,
where
s.t.
where N is the number of sub-regions (intervals) that is indexed by superscript i; g i is the maximum derivative for interval i.
The process critical time is essentially a combination of an Euler-type discretization scheme with the Pontryagin's minimum principle. Naturally, for a single-state system and for an infinitesimally small step size, the discretization is exact and as N ! 1, v ! t. An important advantage of the critical time formulation is that even for a smaller number of intervals, the solution is always a valid underestimate to the actual solution (Uygun et al., 2003) . To differentiate the cases with different values of N, the approximate process critical time is defined asṽ N , where N is the number of intervals used in evaluation.
It should be noted the dynamic optimization problem in equations (2) through (6) could also be solved through numeric dynamic optimization. Nevertheless, such an approach is not preferred, because due to the complexity introduced by time dependence the solutions are very susceptible to entrapment in local minima, and as such the estimations for MTD will not be very reliable. This could produce results that would falsely identify the system as secure. The g-analysis method, on the other hand, dissects the problem into a large number of much smaller decoupled static problems which are far simpler to solve. The solutions, therefore, are tremendously more reliable, although global optimality cannot be guaranteed for every case.
The essential problem in the g-analysis problem is that it is developed for single-state variable models. The modified minimum principle cannot be applied when additional state variables exist. As such, the practice in evaluation of process critical time is to treat all system variables (except the critical variable) as possible disturbance variables. The assumption is, as a consequence of the worst-case scenario assumption underlying in the analysis technique, to consider that all variables could be directly manipulated by an adversary; hence the governing differential equations [i.e., equation (3)] need not apply. Uygun et al. (2004a) discussed the validity of this assumption in detail, and concluded that it would be valid for some variables (typically external and exposed variables, such as concentration, mass, and volume in the system), but likely invalid for others (internal variables such as temperature and pressure). In such cases, the process critical time omits the dynamic constraints imposed by these additional differential equations. Therefore, for multi-state-variable problems, the g-analysis approach results in exaggeration of the estimated values. However, v is valid as a strict underestimate of the minimum time to disaster. Note that it is possible to use the same method to create an upper-bound so that a confidence interval can be created for the actual minimum time to disaster for the process.
Definition 4 (Uygun et al., 2004a) . The security limit time is calculated by:
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To differentiate the cases with different values of N, the approximate security limit time is defined asṽ N s , where N is the number of intervals used in evaluation.
As discussed above, for multi-state systems, the process critical time is a lower bound evaluated through a relaxation method where the dynamic constraints imposed by the differential equations for non-critical variables are dropped. The security limit time, in a parallel approach creates a valid upper-bound by over tightening these dynamic constraints by setting them equal to zero, which causes all the non-critical state variables to remain at their nominal values [equation (18)]. The development of the upperbound time was presented in detail by Uygun et al. (2004a) .
For security limit time to be a valid upper-bound on MTD, the number of discretizations has to be practically infinite. Also, the state variables y n must satisfy either of the synergy conditions defined by Uygun et al. (2004a) .
Definition 5 (Uygun et al., 2004a) . Synergistic variables are variables for which the following relationship is true:
D and D 0 stand for the quickest paths (time-wise) to the disaster. Note that the paths may be different since there is an additional constraint in the latter case. When the relationship in equation (21) is not obvious, an alternative way for calculating synergy condition was also developed.
Definition 6 (Uygun et al., 2004a) . Strictly synergistic variables are variables for which the following relationship exists:
Note that in Definition 5, the inequality is required only on the average values. Thus, Definition 6 is much stricter compared to the original definition. A simple example of synergistic variables is the temperature in a reactor (y c ) and the temperature in the cooling jacket (y n ). In many cases, the synergistic variables in a system are obvious and can be determined without any mathematical analysis.
The security limit time (v s ), along with the process critical time (v), provide valid and reliable upper and lower bounds on the minimum time to disaster (t). This allows performing process security assessment for chemical systems.
IMPROVED g-ANALYSIS
In evaluation of the process critical time introduced by Uygun et al. (2003) , a zero-order approximation is performed in a discretization process, where it is assumed that the derivative function remains at its maximum value during the transition period for each interval. This means,
for each interval i.
Naturally, this assumption introduces a considerable error to the estimated values unless a large number of intervals are used (1000 is a good number as a rule of thumb).
Note that the approximation is important in security limit time calculations, as it has to be true for validity as an upper-bound.
Normally, the derivative cannot sustain its maximum value, since the critical variables, y c , changes as f c ¼ dy c /dt is non-zero. This, in turn, will decrease the value of f c (since it is already at the maximum, any change can only be a decrease). It is possible to create a better approximation to the derivative function. Let us start with the case when a single interval is used (N ¼ 1) . The definition of process critical time becomes:
Consider constructing a linear approximation to f c (y c ) around the maximum point, y c Ã , where superscript Ã denotes the values maximizing f c so that g ¼ f c (y Ã , d Ã ). This yields:
Rearranging equation (25) yields,
Alternatively, Figure 1 illustrates the first-order approximation as compared to the zero-order approximation: The actual derivative is approximated as a piecewise-continuous function. In zero-order approximation, the derivative is assumed to be constant, at the value equal to its maximum. Accordingly, the area under the curve will always be overestimated. By comparison, the first-order approximation does a linear approximation with the intercept at the maximum value and the slope equal to the derivative of f c with respect to y c at the maximum point, y c Ã . As illustrated, this generates a much improved approximation.
Therefore, using the linear approximation in equation (27), the integral in equation (7) 
wheret is the process critical time with logarithmic firstorder approximation. 
Note that in the direction of integration, dy c ! 0 (since y c,d . y c,0 ). Hence, the following is true:
Integrating both sides yields, 
and therefore,
Remark 1. The significance of Theorem 1 is that it proves that the first-order approximate still preserves the underestimation property of process critical time under all conditions (i.e., single or multiple state-variable systems). The concavity requirement will be relaxed (albeit not entirely) later. Proof. Based on process critical time, it can be stated that:
There are two possible solutions to the g-analysis problem that is a constrained optimization problem: either a necessary condition for optimization is satisfied, or one of the bounds on variables limits the solution. Therefore, the solution can be classified into three categories:
(1) y Each three cases can be observed in Figure 2 . Therefore, we can state that:
Using the definition off c in equation (25), we have:
Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, rearranging and integrating the above equation yields:
y c,0
Corollary 1. Combining Theorems 1 and 2, we can state that:
Therefore,t is a better approximation to t than v. Figure 3 illustrates the reason of concavity assumption. For the first four intervals the first-order approximation preserves the overestimation property as the function is concave, whereas for intervals 5 -8 the function is not concave, hence the linear approximation cannot be stated to overestimate the function anymore. Particularly in interval 6, the approximation clearly underestimates the function.
Multiple Intervals with First-Order Approximation
The calculation oft above uses a single approximation to function f c over the entire y c domain. Obviously, using multiple linear approximations will increase the total accuracy. It is then possible to calculate a separatet for each sub-region defined by the grid:
where superscript N is the number of intervals in the region. Variablet N is referred as process critical time with N intervals. The values oft i are calculated in the same manner, with a change boundary values as follows:
Corollary 2.t N becomes equal to the actual minimum time to disaster (t), if a practically infinite number of intervals is used for a single-variable system. Remark 2. This statement is the result of convergence property of process critical time and Corollary 1, where it states that process security time (t) is a better approximation to the time to disaster (t) than the process critical time (v).t preserves the underestimation property and also yields a better estimate; hence it also shares the property of convergence to actual value of time to disaster (t) with infinite sub-regions. Further, the convergence will be faster, i.e., a smaller number of regions will be sufficient for 'practical infinity'. Note that the magnitude of computational reduction is dependent on the system; however, there will always be such a reduction as a consequence of Corollary 1. Therefore, we can state that as N ! 1, the approximations,
become exact. Hence, for a single-state system we have:
The process constant, t, therefore, is also the process security time with infinite sub-regions. A proof of finite convergence (i.e., convergence to the epsilonneighbourhood of actual value with a finite value of N) also appears possible and is currently under study. . As N ! 1, the linear approximations become exact, i.e., the function is linear, hence also concave. Thus, the concavity requirement can be relaxed totally. This property may be further utilized by specifically arranging the grid so that each region consists of a concave function.
Remark 4. If the derivative function is not concave over the region of evaluation, it is possible that the lower boundary term in equations (29) or (41) produces the logarithm of a negative number due to linear extrapolation of a nonconcave function. This indicates that the function is not concave, and the grid used is not sufficiently fine to assume linearity. The problem can be easily resolved with increasing the number of intervals used in evaluations.
In summary, the process critical time formulation with first-order approximations is given as:
with 
Naturally, the first-order approximation can also be applied to the calculation of the security limit time with an additional constraint [following equation (52)] as given below in equation (57).
To differentiate the approximation order used for security limit time, the symbolt s , will be used. Figure 4 depicts a jacketed CSTR system that is originally given by Luyben (1990) , and also studied for process security by Uygun et al. (2003) . In this example, it is considered that the volumetric holdups and concentration can be manipulated from outside and thus are considered as disturbance variables in addition to the feed and outlet flowrates. Accordingly, the process security model is given below:
CASE STUDY-NON-ISOTHERMAL CSTR
The system parameters and variable ranges (including the variables of the original model) are listed in Table 1 . It is assumed that this model can characterize the system behaviour accurately beyond the normal operation zone. For the process security analysis, the feedback control system is considered to be crippled. The critical variable is the temperature in the reactor (T ), as it is the primary security threat in a possible reaction runaway. The results of g-analysis, performed in optimization software GAMS with different numbers of regions, are displayed in Table 2 . As displayed in Table 2 , process critical time converges towards a value of 1.71 seconds as the number of regions increase, while security limit time reaches towards 73.4 seconds. The true value, therefore, can be concluded to be between 1.7 seconds and 74 seconds. In any case, 74 seconds is still a very short time. This indicates that the process is extremely vulnerable to a security threat. Figure 4 depicts the critical variable trajectories calculated with the improved g-analysis method, for the process critical time and the security limit time. Figure 5 displays predicted escalation of the temperature to the disaster boundary, based on the process critical time and the security limit time. Figure 6 depicts the evolution of the predicted trajectories with changing discretization.
As it can be observed in Table 2 , the convergence is much faster with the improved g-analysis, which reaches the final value with only 100 intervals (or less), where as the conventional g-analysis requires 1000 or more intervals for reaching the same result.
It should be noted that the example case is strictly convex with respect to several variables, which makes the linearity assumption sufficiently close and hence the first-order approximation effective only beyond 100 sub-regions. Due to non-concavity, the underestimation property is not satisfied with a low number of sub-regions, which also renders the calculation of improved g-analysis with less than 10 sub-regions not possible. Despite these problems, the accuracy of predictions is far superior compared to zero-order approximation, and particularly helpful for the security limit time calculations that require a large number of intervals.
DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
This work has introduced an improved calculation algorithm for process security analysis. First-order linear approximations are utilized during the discretization procedure in g-analysis, which replaces the zero-order approximations by Uygun et al. (2003) . As mathematically demonstrated, the new method yields a more accurate and efficient estimator to the time the process can go to disaster zone.
The improvement in computational efficiency is particularly attractive in conducting sensitivity analysis and utilizing the g-analysis method for design of secure systems. One caveat is that the improved methodology requires stepwise concavity of the time derivative function, and care should be taken to ensure that this requirement is met through appropriate discretization.
Also, the optimization problem outlined in this work does not include constraints on the rates of change of the disturbances. Physically, such constraints usually exist, and their inclusion in the optimization problem is necessary for realistic evaluations. Augmenting such constraints are very straightforward, and should be employed when necessary.
There are several important things to note with respect to the process security analysis methods based on the time-todisaster criterion, as discussed and improved upon in this work: first, the time-to-disaster is only a scalar, and is unlikely to capture all the characteristics of the system. For instance, this information could be accompanied with accidental probability, quantifying the likelihood of the realization of the worst case scenario as a pure accident. Another complementary index would be a 'difficulty of threat realization' index, estimating how difficult it would be for a 'saboteur' to achieve the worst case scenario (combining number of people, time necessary, and so on). To the best of our knowledge, the g-analysis is the first attempt at introducing a quantitative index for process security, and many complementary, alternative, or simply better methods could be possible. Also, the reasoning in this work produces an interesting, and somewhat counter-intuitive corollary: the easier it is to manipulate the system, the less secure the process is. In this sense, it could be argued that a state-controllable system is inherently not secure, while a stable but uncontrollable system is inherently secure. In this sense, it appears an 'optimal design' would have to strike a balance between controllability and security. While this discussion is beyond the scope of this work, it could lead to an interesting discussion on how to design inherently secure processes.
